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ABSTRACT: The central supposition of the sceptical controversy regarding rationality in the theory of 
argumentation is that either there are universal standards against which the reasonableness of arguments 
can be evaluate or, conversely, that there are no determinate standards against which arguments can be 
evaluated, and hence no methods by which disputes can be rationally resolved. The paper argues that the 
basic terms of this debate are erroneously defined and that there is a middle path in this sceptical 
controversy. The paper adopts the later Wittgensteinian approach to language and applies it to the concept 
of rationality. Furthermore, it maintains that the search for universal standards of reasonableness in theories 
of argumentation is likely to come to naught, and that, nonetheless, there are discoverable methods by 
which arguments are evaluated, facts constituted, and disputes resolved. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the main topics of this conference is the issue of whether ‘argument’ and 
‘argumentation’ are culture-laden concepts, since they are practiced differently and have 
different status in different cultures. However, the concept of ‘culture-laden’ is notorious 
for its fuzziness. First of all, there is the anthropological diversity regarding the status and 
practices of arguments and argumentation across cultures. Different cultures assign a 
different place to arguments and practices of argumentation. The origin of arguments and 
argumentation is, to begin with, a cultural one and their existence and practices 
presuppose some necessary preconditions belongings to epistemology, sociology, 
politics, ethics and so forth, which are all, again, cultural in origin. Then there is the 
Western European sub-cultural diversity regarding the various sub-cultures of arguments 
and argumentation in modern Western European culture, such as the scientific, medical, 
political, and popular sub-cultures of arguments and argumentation. Last, there is the 
theoretical diversity regarding the various cultures of theorizing about arguments and 
argumentation, as argument and argumentation have been studied from a number of 
viewpoints and defined in a variety of ways (Bruschke 2004, pp. 155-156; Willard 1989). 
This is, no doubt, one of the reasons why the study of argumentation is in a state of 
continuous controversy and why a better understanding of argumentation would be from 
a cross-cultural perspective and carried out with culture awareness.  
As early as philosophy itself, the concept of rationality was thought to be the 
answer to skepticism and, through it, also an answer to the dissolution of the concept of 
MENASHE SCHWED 
argument on account of cultural relativism. Rationalism was and still is thought of as a 
safeguard against the dissolution of correctness, or even truth, into effectiveness, against 
the dissolution of argumentation into rhetoric. One of the recent attempts to clarify the 
borderline between argumentation and rhetoric with the help of rationality is Johnson's 
Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument (2000): 
 
[I]f the practice of argumentation is to be understood, it must be understood in terms of rationality 
(p. 1) […] [However,] argumentation is an extremely powerful and valuable cultural practice that 
has fallen on hard times […] Because an argument is an exercise in rationality, its status and fate 
in the wider culture depend on the culture’s assumptions about the nature and value of rationality 
(p. 11).  
  Argumentation as a practice is intimately connected with rationality. First, argumentation 
depends on rationality […] [Second,] Not only does argumentation depend on rationality, 
argumentation exhibits rationality and increases it. Rationality is highly implicated in 
argumentation […] The thesis […] is that if argumentation is to be properly understood, it must be 
seen as an exhibition of rationality (pp. 12-13). 
 
However, the concept of rationality was and still is vainly thought to be a 
safeguard against the skeptical and relativistic stances, since it is rather common to argue 
nowadays that ‘rationality’ is open to diverse interpretations; that the usage of 
‘rationality’ also differs in different contexts.1 The traditional idea that rationality has to 
satisfy the concepts of universalizability or enforceability is no longer defensible and the 
thesis that rationality is nothing more than the appropriateness of the end-means 
relationship is no longer satisfactory. While this extreme skeptical and relativist point of 
view is not necessary or compulsory, there is no escape from accepting that rationality, as 
it is manifested in practice, has to be culture-sensitive and cultural-laden. But, then, in 
what sense does this culture-laden meaning of rationality preserve the traditional idea of 
rationality and its function and, consequently, regain its place in theories of 
argumentation as a safeguard against extreme skepticism and relativism?  
The term “rationality” has been generally used in theories of arguments to identify 
a focus on the correctness of an argument rather than on its rhetorical features. 
Emphasizing winning and persuading in the study of argumentation amounts to the de-
emphasizing of reasoning and correctness. Argument theorists tend to focus more on 
rhetorical criticism, interpersonal studies of disagreement behaviour, studies of cross-
cultural and cross-disciplinary debates and studies of persuasive and quasi-persuasive 
argumentation (Bruschke 2004, pp. 155-158). Only a small minority of argument 
theorists, such as Johnson (2000), have focused on the correctness of arguments in the 
more traditional sense and, consequently, bothered with the concepts of rationality and 
truth.  
As things currently stand, they pose the following dilemma: On the one hand, the 
goal of mediation of differences or achieving a shared rationale for action was not 
achieved fully, as no lucid definition of how an evaluation of logical and epistemological 
correctness is even possible. On the other hand, there has been considerable success with 
communicative concepts like the dominant reason or common sense of a culture. Willard 
echoes a sentiment common among researchers when he says that:  
                                                 
1 Roy (1992), for instance, shows that epistemic rationality, applicable in natural sciences, has no 
significance in human sciences. 
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Thought and emotion are inseparable […] Rationality comes easily in armchairs. But it may not 
mean much to say that one should be free of prejudice, bias, power, and politics. One never is. 
(Willard 1990, pp. 224-225).  
 
The question is whether there is some middle path in the form of methods of evaluation 
that fuse the unattainable concept of rationality on the one hand with the rhetoric of 
arguments from an audience-centered perspective on the other hand. The answer must lie, 
as Johnson (2000) rightly argues, in the concept of rationality. Johnson’s own solution is 
not satisfactory since his entire approach to rationality is overly dependent on supplying 
the right theory of truth so that his concept of rationality may accomplish itself (Bruschke 
2004). However, any theory of truth, including Bruschke’s (2004) own suggestion for the 
pragmatic theory of truth, will not stand against the well-known skepticism. Johnson’s 
own suggestion and Bruschke’s modifications are traditional in the sense of investigating 
the concepts of rationality and truth “from the outside,” focusing on the objective 
characteristics of these concepts. Instead, the approach should be “from the inside,” 
focusing on understanding the meaning of the concept of rationality as it is manifested in 
the practices of a family of more modest concepts, such as ‘being rational,’ ‘giving 
reasons,’ ‘reasoning’ and so forth. In other words, the later Wittgensteinian approach of 
understanding, as opposed to the natural sciences approach of causal explanation, 
suggests a middle path. This Wittgensteinian approach maintains both that the search for 
general standards of validity, objectivity, reasonableness, and the like, based on the 
concept of rationality is likely to fail, and that nonetheless there are ascertainable 
methods by which arguments are evaluated, disputes resolved, fact constituted, and so on. 
Three concepts participate here: Argumentation, culture and rationality. On the 
one hand, argumentation dissolves into a culture-laden practice and loses its traditional 
decisive role. On the other hand, rationality was thought to be a safeguard against this 
consequence but this concept also dissolves into an insignificant concept. The later 
Wittgensteinian philosophy offers a way out with its constitutive concepts of ‘language-
game’ and ‘form of life.’ It offers a different concept of rationality, which is 
simultaneously sensitive to culture and yet has a significant and decisive role in 
argumentation. 
 
2. THE LATER WITTGENSTEINIAN OUTLOOK IN US 
 
It is important to make clear at the outset that Wittgenstein himself did not talk explicitly 
at all about rationality. But he did talk about language and truth, which are clearly ideas 
which are closely related to those of reason and rationality.2 Thus, this paper sketches 
some thoughts that are drawn from the later Wittgenstein and which are suggested by his 
approach to language. The thoughts from the later Wittgenstein encourage us to think 
about rationality and reason along the same lines of the Wittgensteinian view of language 
and truth. They also encourage us to reject the philosophical tendency towards ‘ideal 
rationality’ and to adopt the more modest concepts of the family of ‘rational,’ 
                                                 
2 The paper sketches some thoughts which fit Wittgenstein’s later outlook and which are implied by his 
approach to language and which are lay out in his Blue and Brown books (1969) (BB), Philosophical 
Investigations (1958) (PI) and On Certainty (1969) (OC). 
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‘rationality,’ ‘reason’ and ‘reasoning’ and their diversity as part of the variety of language 
and our uses of it.  
The identification and examination of the concept of ‘ideal rationality’ will not be 
considered here.3 However, the known difficulties of the concept of ‘ideal rationality’ are 
the truth of the picture of language in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1961). Later, in his 
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argues that these ideal concepts of language 
and reasoning have unacceptable presuppositions, when they set a standard for actual 
human beings as opposed to ideal model of language and thought. Wittgenstein refers to 
the Tractatus’ ideas and their consequences as dogmatic. He uses this term to designate 
any conception which allows for a gap between a question (e.g., what is ideal 
rationality?) and an answer, such that the answer to the question could be found at a later 
date. However, the answer to such questions cannot be found on principle and, thus, 
labelled as dogmatism. Thus, the move from the realm of formal logic to that of ordinary 
language and from an emphasis of definition and analysis to ‘family resemblance,’ 
‘language-games’ and ‘forms of life’ marks the transition towards anti-dogmatism. In a 
corresponding manner, the dogmatic concept of ‘ideal rationality’ should not be taken to 
be the central concept in the light of which more modest concepts, which do or might 
actually apply to human beings, are to be described. For this task, one should turn to 
speculating about the practices which provide the context for any concept in the 
reason/rational family of concepts. That is, what features of language and forms of life in 
general ground the use of any concept in the ‘reason/rational’ family and what can be 
expected of this family. 
The Wittgensteinian approach is a call for a change of perspective in the 
traditional understanding of the concept of rationality, whether dogmatic or skeptical. In 
an analogous manner to his famous statement about “meaning as use” (PI §43), the basic 
statement is that for a large class of cases in which people employ the concepts in the 
reason/rational family, the meaning of these concepts is their use in the language. It is 
first and foremost a change of perspective, which characterizes Wittgenstein’s later 
thought: a change from a conception of rationality as representation to a view which 
looks to use as the hinge of the investigation. Traditional theories of rationality in the 
history of philosophy were intent on pointing to something exterior to the practices, 
which endow it with sense. This anti-dogmatic approach is the following philosophical 
lesson: “if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say 
that it was its use” (BB, 4). That is, a move from the exterior of the practices to their 
interior. Focusing on the use of the idea of rationality will not end in any constructive 
                                                 
3 There are some studies on the issue of ‘ideal rationality’ which fill this gap satisfactorily. John Pollock, in 
his Thinking about Acting (2006), offers a theory of rational decision making for real agents, as contrasted 
with ideal ones. Real agents have limited cognitive powers, but traditional theories of rationality have 
applied only to idealized agents that lack such constraints. He further argues that theories of ideal 
rationality are largely irrelevant to the decision making of real agents and, thus, in need for ‘real 
rationality’ in its place. A good summery of this issue is given by Reiner (1995), which gives an exposition 
of the different conceptions of perfect rationality, and the various sorts of arguments against them. Then he 
clarifies which conceptions of perfect rationality are targeted by which counter-arguments and, finally, 
attempts to systematize the results. Cummins, Poirier, & Roth (2004) study the fallow field between the 
norms of ideal rationality and the practicalities of human limitations and argue for the naturalistic 
epistemological approach, in which normative assessment is constrained by capacities and the complexity 
of the saying that ought implies can. 
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theory building. Rather, when investigating rationality, one must “look and see” the 
variety of uses to which the idea is put, as Wittgenstein insists: “Don’t think but look!” 
(PI §66). And looking is done by studying particular cases and not hypothetical 
generalizations. In this process of constructing the meaning of the concepts in the 
reason/rational family, any explanatory generalization should be replaced by a description 
of use. Thus, the traditional idea that rationality houses a kind of monolithic and 
transcendental meaning gives way to an emphasis on the diversity of uses. 
 
3. LANGUAGE-GAME 
 
However, in order to address the above mentioned countless multiplicity of uses and their 
looseness, Wittgenstein introduces the key concept of ‘language-game.’ This theoretical 
concept is supposed to be more suitable for a more fluid, more diversified, and more 
activity-oriented perspective on language (PI §23). Wittgenstein explicitly includes 
various concepts of the reason/rational family in the “regular” language-games, which is 
amazing in itself: 
 
Here the term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that speaking of 
language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. 
Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others: 
[…] 
Reporting an event — 
Speculating about an event — 
Forming and testing a hypothesis — 
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams — 
[…] 
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic — 
[…]  
— It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are 
used […] (PI §23). 
 
These activities and many others alike activities constitutes the paradigmatic 
concepts in the reason/rational family that are woven in language-games and involve not 
only words but activities. Each of the concepts of the family of ‘rational,’ ‘rationality, 
’reason,’ ‘reasoning’ and so forth, is first and foremost an activity: “We are talking about 
the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-
temporal phantasm […]” (PI §108). Rationality does not existing any longer outside of 
time and space and, thus, the study of rationality should be fixed in the study of language-
games, which shifts the traditional focus from the human being that pretend to be rational 
to her activities in the framework of a language-game. This is a crucial shift, since when 
discussing concepts like reasonableness, there is the expected difficulty of committing the 
fallacy of division (cf. Schagrin 1973): While it is proper to characterize a group of 
people as reasonable (e.g., a group of scientists), it is not such regarding an individual 
(e.g., a certain scientist). The mistake here is as follows: One can search for a scientific 
method in the sense of rules, principles or criteria for use by individual scientists in 
making reasonable choices of hypotheses and argue that the enterprise of science results 
in a reasonable selection of hypotheses. Furthermore, one can even continue and argue 
that the individual behaviour of a scientist is reasonable or not insofar as it coincides with 
the judgments of the scientific profession. Considered by itself, however, an individual 
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scientist’s judgment is neither reasonable nor unreasonable. The scientific community 
might be rational since it makes rational decisions. But it makes no sense to say of an 
individual scientist of that community that she makes her decisions in a rational way. 
This point is part of Wittgenstein’s insistency in his On Certainty (1969, pp. 336, 559) 
and part of the complex meaning of the notion of language-game. Accordingly, a person 
is not rational but her behaviour is rational due to her participating in a specific language-
game, which involves the concepts in the reason/rational family. It is the language-game 
that manifests a rational behaviour and not the person herself. 
 
4. RULE-FOLLOWING 
 
These argumentative uses of language in the above citation (PI §23) and their 
descriptions are language-games since they are rule-governed. This does not entail strict 
and definite systems of rules for those language-games regarding argumentation in 
general and the concepts in the reason/rational family in particular. Instead, these more 
specific language-games point to the conventional nature of the reasoned and rational sort 
of human activity.  
Rationality cannot be constituted out from abstract rules that transcend all of the 
particular applications of the concept. It is not the case where knowing the rules that 
constitute the concept of rationality involve grasping some abstract entity and thereby 
knowing how to use it. This is exactly the dogmatic stance that Wittgenstein opposed to 
in Philosophical Investigations. In a series of paragraphs (PI §185-243) Wittgenstein 
wants to liberate us from the need to posit any sort of external or internal authority to the 
authorship of the rules beyond the actual applications of the rules. Questions, such as: 
How do we learn the rules? How do we follow them? Wherefrom the standards which 
decide if a rule is followed correctly? and so forth, are questionable themselves. There is 
no fact of the matter here regarding a rigid definition of what it means to act in 
accordance with a rule or in conflict with it and Wittgenstein insists on obfuscating the 
whole issue of rule following (PI §201). 
 
5. FORM OF LIFE 
 
Those argumentative uses of language in the above citation (PI §23) and their 
descriptions are a part of a broader context termed by Wittgenstein as form of life. This is 
where the later Wittgenstein’s thoughts play the more considerable role in their 
application to the concept of rationality. It begins with the celebrated ‘private-language 
argument,’ which follows naturally the above rule-following discussion. It may be argued 
accordingly that any act or use of the concepts in the reason/rational family and any such 
utterance are meaningful if and only if it is possible in principle to subject them to public 
standards and criteria of correctness. For this reason, ‘truth,’ ‘reasons’ and ‘acting 
rationally’ cannot have individual meaning and be known and have a specific sense only 
to the person or specific group of persons speaking (PI §243), since such uses are not a 
genuine, meaningful, rule-governed language. These concepts in the reason/rational 
family, as specific language-games, can only function when there is a possibility of 
judging the correctness of their use: “So the use of this word stands in need of a 
justification which everybody understands” (PI §261). For the meaning of this ‘social 
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understanding and acceptance,’ Wittgenstein offers his other celebrated notion of 
‘grammar.’ Here again, Wittgenstein offers a more wider and more elusive meaning of 
grammar then is usually understood and describes it as a network of rules which 
determine what linguistic move is allowed as making sense, and what is not. Instead of a 
formal meaning of grammar, Wittgenstein describes the “rules” of grammar as expressing 
the norms for meaningful language: they describe how we use words in order to both 
justify and criticize our particular utterances and are part of the regular activity with 
which language-games are closely linked and, thus, “[…] the term ‘language-game’ is 
meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an 
activity, or of a form of life” (PI §23). The concept of ‘form of life,’ although used by 
Wittgenstein only five times in the Philosophical Investigations (19, 23, 241, pp. 174, 
226), is an intriguing and fruitful concept in general and with regards to the question of 
rationality in particular: 
 
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?”—It is what 
human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not 
agreement in opinions but in form of life" (PI §241). 
 
The essence of the term ‘language-game’ is that “the speaking of language is part 
of an activity, or of a form of life” (PI §23). Wittgenstein stresses that speaking is a rule-
guided activity but he goes further by holding that our language-games are interwoven 
with non-linguistic activities, and must be understood within this context. This holds not 
only for actual language-games but also to fictitious language-games. Those fictitious 
ones can be properly assessed and understood only if the non-linguistic context of 
fictitious language-games is taken into the overall account. The non-linguistic context is 
essential to understanding fictitious linguistic activities and their understanding is 
possible only when they fit in with the overall practice of the fictitious community, which 
uses these language-games: “To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life” (PI 
§7, §19; cf., BB § 134). Thus, it is necessary ultimately to deal with the general notion of 
form of life that encompasses those linguistic and non-linguistic activities, either actual or 
fictitious. 
The most natural reading of ‘form of life’ is as a changing and contingent notion, 
which is dependent on history, context, etc. such that the notion has to be an essential part 
of the concept of culture. Accordingly, the notion of rationality as  the concepts in the 
reason/rational family are part of forms of life, patterns of behaviour and systems of 
reference by which people engaging in these forms of life think and speak. This does not 
contradict the relativistic aura of Wittgenstein, since these forms of life are still changing 
and contingent, historical, sensitive to context and, thus, dependent on culture. 
 
6. “RATIONALITY AS USE” 
 
How does this construction of rationality according to the Wittgensteinian approach can 
cope with the assumption that any of the argumentative language-games and their 
respective form of life cannot be compatible with the concept of ‘ideal rationality’? One 
possible answer, which the paper adopts, is that the word ‘rationality’ expresses a family 
of related concepts rather than one sharply defined notion. To begin with, this family of 
concepts is not a random collection, but a family of concepts in the sense of the 
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Wittgensteinian notion of family resemblance. These concepts, as ‘rational,’ ‘rationality,’ 
‘reason,’ and ‘reasoning,’ which constitute a family of concepts, are connected by a series 
of overlapping similarities, where no one feature is common to all: “I can think of no 
better expression to characterize these similarities than “family resemblances”” (PI §67).4 
One of the lessons Wittgenstein teaches us in this respect is that when coming to study 
such an important feature of human life as rationality, one should reject general 
explanations and definitions based on sufficient and necessary conditions. There is no 
reason to look, as philosophers done traditionally—and dogmatically—for one, essential 
core in which the meaning of the concept of rationality is located and which is, therefore, 
common to all uses of that concept. One should, instead, explore the concept’s uses 
through “a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing” (PI §66). 
The more useful Wittgensteinian way will be to appeal to similarity of a kind with family 
resemblance between the concepts of the family of ‘rational,’ ‘rationality,’ ‘reason,’ 
‘reasoning’ and so forth. ‘Reasoning’ and ‘rationality’ “has not the formal unity that I 
imagined [in the Tractatus], but is the family of structures more or less related to one 
another.” (PI §108). 
People use language in various ways and give birth to various language-games. 
The place to look for the use of the concepts of the rational/reason family is where the use 
of the language has to do with utterances occurring in the setting of reasoning and giving 
reasons and the like. The paradigms of reasoning and exercising rationality are those 
linguistic exchanges that have to do with linguistic situations of acceptance, dissent, 
inference, investigation, doubt, debate, persuasion and so forth.  
But where do the study of argumentation and not its uses comes in? The need for 
the concepts of the family of ‘reason,’ ‘reasoning’ or ‘rational’ arises when people reflect 
about these language-games and seek to describe them and asses them. The linguistic 
practices, including those of ‘debate,’ ‘discussion,’ ‘proving,’ ‘argument,’ ‘persuasion’ 
and the like, invite not only their use but also their study. Thus, along with these 
practices, there will be also attempts to study, systematize, improve, and elaborate these 
practices. Just as people go to conferences on argumentation, people have developed a 
rich variety of ideas about reasoning and being rational. Some of them did an 
extraordinary work, like Aristotle, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein and many more. However, 
these speculations did not end up in one best language-game or concept. Even 
Wittgenstein himself rejected his own Tractatus and its ideal language and way of 
reasoning. On the contrary, the later Wittgenstein shows that the meaning of ‘reasoning’ 
or ‘being rational’ is divergent and depends on forms of life; it is divergent because of 
contrasts between groups of people and historical periods, between different social 
structures and so forth, and in short, because of culture. According to later Wittgenstein, 
the elaborations of concepts and tools for debating and reasoning are corollaries of 
changes in language-games and in forms of life of those who employ these language-
games. According to this line of thought, it is expected that these various language-games 
are shaped as a result of cultural changes and developments in the course of time and 
over cross-cultures in a specific time. 
The rationality family of concepts is subject to a continuous evolution not only in 
how many language-games there are that contains each of these concepts, but evolution 
                                                 
4 The Wittgensteinian idea of family resemblance is mainly an anti-essentialist approach in philosophy. For 
critical expositions of this idea, see: Bangu (2005) and Tessin (1996). 
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as to the kind of language-games there are. This is the result of the fact that the rules of 
language-games are not unchangeable laws (PI §23): “language is part of an activity or of 
a form of life.” The various argumentative language-games, which contain the rationality 
family of concepts is woven into culture and the words/concepts are woven into 
activities, which are all forms of life: “And to imagine a language means to imagine a 
form of life.” (PI §19). 
The studies in argumentation are in one sense studies of various language-games, 
in which reason-giving discussion is prominent. These studies concentrate on linguistic 
situations, such as dialogue in which the conversers hope to reach agreement or 
understanding, or monologue in which a person engages on his own in reflection about 
issues which concern him. These linguistic situations and other alike call for various 
kinds of evaluations, judgments, assessments and so forth, since such notions are intrinsic 
part of making claims and offering support for them. However, as the studies show, there 
is a cultural variety of these practices and, above all, the Western tradition in which 
Greece had a major part, seem to have been gripped very early by one sort of reasoning. 
This sort of reasoning is shaped by the paradigms of arithmetic and geometry as a 
conclusive and context independent process of proof. But other cultures have developed 
different sorts of reasoning and constituted different argumentative language-games.5 
Thus, in defining ‘rational’ or ‘rationality’ one should avoid any sign of essentialism and 
any trait of form or abstraction. This last point is a well known Wittgensteinian insistency 
that no final and essential definition of the ‘rational language-game’ can be given:  
 
what is common to all these activities and what makes them into language or parts of language 
[…] these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all,—
but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this 
relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all “language.” (PI §65). 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
The starting point of the paper is the widespread skeptical and relativistic assumption that 
it is impossible to recover general standards for the validity or correctness of 
argumentation, which leads inevitably to the conclusion that there are no standards (of 
intelligibility, cogency, reasonableness, and so forth) to which arguments can be held 
answerable in situ. Consequently, there are no methods by which disputes between 
competing claims can reasonably be resolved. The acceptance of this idea forces a choice 
between the alternatives of continuing the search for universally justified standards for 
rationality and truth on the one hand, and the subscription to the doctrine that there are no 
legitimate rules and standards for rationality and truth and hence no hope for any sense 
for the concepts of rationality and truth on the other hand. This is but only one way to 
describe in general terms the modernist/postmodernist or the enlightenment/anti-
enlightenment debates in contemporary Western culture. They are the terms within which 
Habermas argues for the need to complete the unfinished project of modernity (Habermas 
1977).   
                                                 
5 Ian Hacking argues in his Historical Ontology (2002) that historical perspective in philosophy clearly 
emphasizes the contingency and variety of ways of thinking. 
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The later Wittgensteinian thoughts on language suggest a middle path, which 
maintains both that the search for general standards of validity, objectivity, 
reasonableness, and the like, is likely to end in disappointment, and that nonetheless there 
are ascertainable methods by which arguments are evaluated, disputes resolved, fact 
constituted, and so on. This Wittgensteinian middle path regarding these ascertainable 
methods rejects the traditional debates between rationalism and nihilism. In doing so, this 
middle path follows Wittgenstein’s (1958) remarks on the relativity of rules or standards 
of validity, objectivity, reasonableness, and the like, and apply them to argumentative 
practices in the sense that nothing regarding the rational properties of argumentative 
practices is obtained outside tangible settings of these practices within which such 
properties are recognized, used, produced and discussed. 
A Wittgensteinian approach will begin with the phenomena of our ability to 
engage in discursive and persuasive linguistic exchanges. The need for the concepts of 
‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ are rooted in these uses and are defined according to them. But, 
as Wittgenstein emphasizes on many occasions, these linguistic exchanges are various 
and, thus, the concepts of ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ cannot be monolithic concepts, but 
are expected to come in many versions, which are formed by history and culture. This 
diversity and its historical and cultural roots in Western culture and history are in 
opposition to the traditional philosophical temptation to conceptualize a kind of ‘ideal 
rationality.’ Giving this line of thoughts, rationality—in the meaning of some ‘ideal 
rationality’—loses its traditional place and meaning. However, abandoning the concept of 
rationality all together is not the only way of action left, since another way of action is 
still open according to the Wittgensteinian approach: Instead of conceptualizing about 
some concept of ‘ideal rationality,’ one can turn around and look at those practices and 
uses of discursive and persuasive linguistic exchanges, which manifest reasoning and 
rationality. ‘Rationality’ is a word with many uses in many kinds of situations and, thus, 
expresses a tangle of related concepts rather than one sharply defined concept, like its 
associates ‘reason,’ ‘rational,’ ‘reasoning’ and more.  
This Wittgensteinian middle path is no doubt anthropocentric and hence, sensitive 
to cultural diversity, although not necessarily adopting the questionable multiculturalism 
stance. Accordingly, there are no independent, objective points of support outside human 
action, thought and speech, and meaning and necessity are preserved only in the linguistic 
practices which embody them. They are reliable only because the practices gain certain 
stability from rules. But even the rules do not provide a fixed point of reference, because 
they always allow divergent interpretations. What really gives the practices their stability 
is that people agree in their interpretations of the rules. It is what gives people the ability 
to think and speak in the first place. 
 
         Link to commentary 
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